La resistencia a la censura se está convirtiendo en infraestructura digital

En el mundo hiper‑digital e interconectado de hoy, la censura en internet sigue siendo utilizada en numerosos estados‑nación, lo que hace que la resistencia a la censura sea extremadamente importante. Cada vez se percibe más como una protección para la libre expresión, la comunicación abierta y la libertad individual, y está convirtiéndose en una forma de infraestructura digital.

A medida que los gobiernos, reguladores y operadores de plataformas despliegan mecanismos cada vez más sofisticados para controlar los flujos de información, monitorear las comunicaciones y restringir el acceso a servicios, se vuelve crítico comunicarse, transaccionar y coordinarse sin interferencias.

Por ejemplo, los apagones de internet afectaron a unos asombrosos 4,6 mil millones de personas, más de la mitad de la población mundial, el año pasado. La libertad de internet a nivel global ha estado en declive durante quince años consecutivos, según Freedom House.

Pero eso no es todo. Las herramientas de la censura moderna también se han vuelto más sofisticadas. La censura ya no es tan simple como bloquear sitios web o moderar contenido.

Hoy, la censura opera cada vez más a través de filtrado a nivel de red, inspección profunda de paquetes, huellas de protocolos, análisis de tráfico asistido por IA, regímenes de listas blancas, restricciones financieras, controles mediados por plataformas y tecnologías de vigilancia exportadas que pueden identificar y cortar flujos de comunicación específicos con gran precisión.

Los gobiernos están construyendo sistemas que les permiten controlar, filtrar o incluso apagar la infraestructura subyacente de internet. Como resultado, han surgido tecnologías resistentes a la censura que abarcan comunicaciones cifradas, redes descentralizadas, infraestructura que preserva la privacidad y sistemas financieros sin permiso.

Lo que antes era solo una necesidad para disidentes y periodistas y el dominio de los defensores de la privacidad está evolucionando hacia una capa tecnológica más amplia que sustenta la propia internet. Este cambio está convirtiéndose rápidamente en la nueva realidad de la era digital.

Esto muestra que, a medida que las restricciones digitales se vuelven más sofisticadas, la resistencia a la censura se trata no solo como una característica, sino como infraestructura: una capacidad esencial que soporta el flujo libre de información, capital y actividad económica a través de fronteras. En consecuencia, la investigación sobre la medición de la censura y la elusión ha atraído un creciente y serio interés académico, institucional y financiero.

As the latest study notes:

“The growing deployment of censorship techniques as well as increasing global attention to digital rights and freedoms have fundamentally shaped the field over the past decade.”

The Evolution of Censorship into Digital Infrastructure

Censorship has existed in various forms throughout history. We saw it happen with the suppression of books and newspapers, then the regulation of radio, television, and telecommunications.

At its core, censorship is about restricting people’s access to information, communication, or expression, usually for political, social, economic, or security reasons.

In the digital era, censorship has become technical. This involves blocking websites, filtering content, throttling services, manipulating DNS responses, inspecting encrypted traffic, or shutting down internet connectivity entirely. Occasionally, state censorship even leads to the arrest of individuals who said the wrong things online.

Internet censorship is not new, but the machinery behind it has certainly gone through a fundamental transformation. Over the last decade, censorship as law enforcement has been replaced by censorship as infrastructure, where it is baked right into the network.

The architecture of modern censorship operates not only autonomously at scale but also across multiple layers simultaneously. At the network layer, governments mandate that internet service providers route all domestic traffic through centralized inspection points. At the transport layer, deep packet inspection systems analyze not just where traffic is going but what it contains.

At the application layer, platforms are pressured to pre-censor content before it is even posted, and DNS resolution is manipulated to ensure that the addresses citizens type never resolve to the pages they are trying to reach.

Then there’s the financial layer, where payment systems are weaponized to defund organizations that authorities deem threatening and stop democratic opposition in its tracks.

La dominación del gasto digital en el mundo actual significa que la mayoría de las transacciones son visibles para las autoridades, lo que permite a los gobiernos ver quién compra qué, quién paga a quién y quién dona a qué causa, dándoles el poder de cerrar a sus enemigos con solo pulsar un botón.

Aunque las intervenciones se justifican por motivos de seguridad nacional, orden público, protección cultural y cumplimiento regulatorio, también pueden usarse para suprimir la disidencia, limitar la oposición política y controlar el discurso público.

Uno de los ejemplos más prominentes de la sofisticación de la censura digital incluye el “Gran Cortafuegos” de China, que bloquea material políticamente sensible. La Administración del Ciberespacio de China está incluso buscando censura de contenido en tiempo real a través de proveedores de internet satelital, extendiendo el Gran Cortafuegos a la infraestructura orbital.

Luego está Rusia, que ha bloqueado YouTube, X y WhatsApp y desplegado un sistema basado en DPI conocido como TSPU (medios técnicos para contrarrestar amenazas) como una capa de filtrado de tráfico mandatada por el Estado a nivel de ISP y manipulación. El país también está desarrollando activamente un régimen de listas blancas que bloqueará todo el tráfico de internet por defecto, permitiendo solo a un puñado de servicios aprobados por el gobierno funcionar.

Irán es otro ejemplo importante, habiendo impuesto repetidamente restricciones de red y apagones durante periodos de agitación civil.

Lo notable es que estos casos no son raros sino que ocurren constantemente en todo el mundo, con apagones de internet y restricciones de plataformas registradas en numerosos países durante elecciones, protestas y periodos de inestabilidad política.

Estos eventos impiden la libertad de expresión, pero eso no es todo; las consecuencias de la censura van mucho más allá.

Las restricciones a las redes de comunicación obstaculizan la actividad económica, limitan el acceso de las personas a recursos educativos, interrumpen el periodismo y reducen la confianza en los sistemas digitales. Los apagones de internet, mientras tanto, han sido estimados en costos de miles de millones de dólares para las economías debido a la pérdida de productividad, el comercio interrumpido y el acceso reducido a servicios digitales.

A medida que las sociedades dependen cada vez más de las redes digitales, la censura ya no es simplemente una cuestión de control de información. Lo que se ha convertido es una cuestión de resiliencia de la infraestructura: cómo la gente se comunica, accede a servicios, realiza negocios y participa en la economía global.

Measuring and Circumventing Modern Censorship: The Study in Focus

With the complexity of censorship growing and with that, the need for sophisticated measurement and circumvention technologies, a new study explores this challenge extensively.

The academic review titled “A Review of Internet Censorship: Modern Measurement and Circumvention Techniques¹” by Thomas Grübl, Francisco Enguix, and Burkhard Stiller of the University of Zürich and the Universitat Politècnica de València provides a comprehensive map of both the censorship problem and the technical responses to it.

Publicado el in ScienceDirect, the paper applies a semi-systematic literature review methodology to 146 contemporary studies and offers a taxonomy of measurement and circumvention techniques to help readers understand the technical dimensions of the censorship-resistance challenge.

The central finding of the study is that censorship and censorship resistance have evolved into a continuous technological arms race. As governments adopt more advanced filtering, inspection, and blocking mechanisms, researchers and developers respond with increasingly sophisticated methods to detect and bypass those controls.

The authors document how modern censorship extends far beyond simple IP and URL blocking toward deep packet inspection systems capable of identifying encrypted traffic.

Traffic encryption refers to transforming information into a safe format that can only be accessed by authorized users. But it can now be identified based on statistical features, examining not just what a packet says but what it looks like.

The reality is that censors today can filter traffic based on DNS requests, IP addresses, ports, Transport Layer Security (TLS) metadata, protocol fingerprints, and even statistical characteristics of encrypted traffic. In some cases, encrypted traffic itself may become a target for blocking if it exhibits identifiable patterns associated with circumvention tools.

For instance, in noviembre de 2021, China did this by temporarily blocking all traffic whose characteristics matched those of encrypted protocols, including at the statistical layer.

This forced circumvention tool developers to adopt “protocol mimicry” techniques that design traffic to look like ordinary HTTPS or other permitted protocols at the packet level. Marionette, Proteus, and uTLS are some tools that enable programmable obfuscation of this kind.

Then there are more advanced systems like Snowflake, NetShuffle, and SpotProxy that use ephemeral proxy architectures, making enumeration attacks against their infrastructure extremely difficult because the IP addresses and server instances involved are constantly rotating.

But not all censorship-resistant technologies, which “allow users to regain access to information by circumventing censorship ranging from localized and temporal restrictions to large-scale and long-term state-level interventions,” work equally well. The authors note:

“Some are more effective and user-friendly than others, serving different levels of technical expertise.”

Circumvention techniques are cataloged across two main categories. One is routing-based approaches, including proxying, alibi routing, and connection splitting; the other is obfuscation-based approaches, including steganography, protocol mimicry, DPI evasion, and covert tunneling.

However, the study finds a significant gap between the development of these evasion technologies and their real-world deployment.

“Despite the growing number of new circumvention techniques, their adoption remains low,” says the study, adding that foundational systems such as The Onion Routing (Tor), The Invisible Internet Project (I2P), and Virtual Private Network (VPN), especially when used in combination with the likes of Snowflake, obfs4, and meek, are the ones serving people living under censorship.

VPNs, Tor, and I2P route traffic through multiple distributed nodes, providing strong privacy and anonymity guarantees.

The commercialization and widespread adoption of VPN services, in particular, have made censorship-resistant tools “become accessible to a broader audience,” a major step away from being the domain of only tech-savvy users and human rights advocates.

These fundamental tools are battle-tested, continuously updated by large communities of developers, and designed to adapt with the evolution of blocking techniques; thus they “continue to serve as essential tools for journalists and activists worldwide to circumvent state-level censorship.”

Adaptability, as per the study, is the key design principle. That’s because censors can always add new entries to a blocklist, so static solutions are often identified and blocked.

In contrast, systems that can dynamically change routes, protocols, fingerprints, or endpoints impose significantly higher costs on censors. They cannot easily block traffic that appears to be unremarkable HTTPS traffic flowing to major cloud infrastructure.

Hence, many promising techniques such as refraction networking, alibi routing, and steganographic covert channels remain mostly theoretical or limited to small-scale pilots.

Refraction networking, which has attracted at least 12 academic papers over the past decade, requires cooperation among multiple ISPs to function, making it infeasible in the regions where it is most needed. Meanwhile, steganographic systems that hide communication inside public content streams, such as video or game traffic, face being blocked the moment censors identify the pattern and simply restrict access to the underlying carrier service.

The authors note that niche video games used for censorship circumvention could be blocked without significant collateral damage, which is overestimated, since some nation-states are already willing to block widely-used services like Gmail.

An important institutional development noted by the study is the emergence of large-scale censorship measurement platforms. This includes OONI (Open Observatory of Network Interference), Censored Planet, and ICLab, which continuously monitor censorship practices worldwide, publish open datasets, and provide practical circumvention strategies.

These platforms have transformed the research landscape, enabling near real-time analysis of censorship events and longitudinal study of how blocking behavior evolves. Instead of being tools for individual circumvention, they provide genuine censorship-resistance infrastructure at the institutional level that allows researchers and tool developers worldwide to understand what they are up against.

Among other insights into where the field stands today, the study confirms that censorship measurement has a geographic concentration problem.

Research attention has concentrated around China, Russia, Iran, and India, “due to their strict censorship regimes and geopolitical relevance,” while regions with meaningful censorship, such as much of sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Latin America, and war-affected zones like Ukraine, receive little attention.

Meanwhile, Cuba, where censorship levels are high, has captured almost no academic scrutiny, meaning “the focus of censorship measurements only partly aligns with actual censorship prevalence.”

The thing is, it’s not just an academic concern, as the measurement infrastructure used to design circumvention tools is biased toward contexts that are already well understood. Meanwhile, less-studied regions are left without tools that are evaluated for their specific environments.

Overall, the paper shows that censorship resistance isn’t a niche research area anymore. It has become a key layer of internet architecture, driven by the need to maintain access, connectivity, and resilience in a world where digital restrictions continue to expand.

Censorship Resistance as an Investable Infrastructure Layer

Against the backdrop of sophisticated modern censorship systems, there is now a growing demand for censorship resistance that volunteer platforms alone can’t satisfy.

As a result, an infrastructure layer is emerging, comprising protocols and services that are resistant to intervention by centralized authorities. Besides decentralization, they also improve privacy, provide permissionless access, and enhance network resilience.

Interestingly, rather than existing only as applications, many censorship-resistant systems are evolving into platforms upon which other services can be built.

Bitcoin (BTC ) is a great example of this, providing a solution to censorship at the financial layer. While circumvention techniques like Tor, I2P, and VPNs allow journalists, activists, and those on political blacklists to access information that’s blocked, governments can still destroy their ability to fund their work by freezing bank accounts, blocking payment processors, and having domestic banks refuse to process their transactions.

All of these measures aren’t even hypothetical threats, but rather actual realities. For instance, Russian democracy advocate Ruslan Shaveddinov publicly stated in junio de 2025 that the fintech company Revolut cut off access to its funds, in response to pressure from the Putin government.

Bitcoin was designed precisely for such a situation, and that’s why for years, opposition leader Alexei Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation have been utilizing Bitcoin wallets to “overcome financial repression.” The use of the decentralized digital asset allows them to pay staff, receive donations, and continue operating despite systematic repression.

Bitcoin is a decentralized monetary network that operates without a central authority that can reject or reserve transactions.

Not only is there no country or company in control of Bitcoin, but there is no third party managing access. This is in complete contrast to the traditional payment systems, which rely on banks, payment processors, and intermediaries.

With no centralized gatekeeper for users to request permission to participate in the system, they can freely move value anywhere in the world. Anyone, regardless of their geography, race, gender, political affiliation, socioeconomic status, or institutional position, can access this neutral monetary protocol.

This is achieved through a distributed network of participants spread across the globe. What’s more is that every transaction is stored on the blockchain, which anyone can see and verify.

While it’s still possible for a government, corporation, or financial intermediary to restrict a user’s access to Bitcoin through centralized exchanges or wallets, they cannot prevent the network itself from processing a valid transaction.

Besides providing a censorship-resistant way to transfer value, Bitcoin also allows one to store their assets in self-custodial wallets, giving users complete control over their funds.

Importantly, Bitcoin has a strong, nearly two-decades-long history, during which it has built a solid ecosystem that maintains access to the network and ensures its operations even under adverse circumstances.

For instance, Bitcoin transactions can be relayed via satellite networks and radio transmissions, strengthening the network’s ability to function even when internet access is curbed. These developments have given rise to a robust censorship-resistant infrastructure for individuals and organizations operating under authoritarian conditions.

As restrictions on digital activity become more sophisticated, Bitcoin offers not only a valuable digital asset to invest in but also an open, censorship-resistant infrastructure on a global scale that enables participation in the digital economy even when traditional intermediaries impose restrictions.

Conclusion

Digital networks play a critical role in communication, commerce, and social organization, leading to their regulation and restriction. Modern censorship employs increasingly sophisticated technical mechanisms that can filter information, monitor traffic, and restrict access at scale.

But at the same time, we now have mature technologies to resist these controls, preserve access, and improve privacy, which is transforming censorship resistance into a foundational layer of digital infrastructure.

From encrypted communication networks, decentralized routing systems, and anonymous overlay networks to permissionless financial protocols like Bitcoin, the ability to communicate and transact without centralized interference is fast becoming a core capability of the digital age.

References

1. Grübl, T., Enguix, F. & Stiller, B. A review of internet censorship: Modern measurement and circumvention techniques. Computer Science Review 62, 101002 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2026.101002