규제 당국이 GENIUS 법안 마감일을 놓쳤으며, 이는 기회다

2026년 7월 18일, GENIUS 법안이 서명된 지 정확히 1년이 된 날, 이를 실행 규칙으로 만들 책임이 있는 기관들은 조용히 마감일을 넘겼습니다. 재무부, OCC, FDIC, NCUA 및 연방준비제도는 대략 열 건의 제안을 12개월 동안 내놓았지만, 하나도 최종 확정되지 않았습니다.

기념일 보도는 제도적 실패라는 표현에 초점을 맞추었으며, 이는 잘못된 결론으로 이어지는 합리적인 직관입니다. 미완성된 규칙서는 수정 가능한 것이며, 이 업계가 이미 확정된 것으로 간주한 수익 금지 조항이 가장 논쟁할 가치가 있는 조항입니다.

Stablecoins 올해 4월 초에 3,170억 달러의 유통량을 넘어섰으며, 2025년 초 이후 50% 이상 성장했습니다. 이 규모의 자금은 누군가의 초안에 찍는 형식적인 승인보다 더 나은 대우를 받아야 합니다.

미완성된 규칙서는 수정 가능한 것이다

Section 13 gave the primary federal regulators one year from enactment to promulgate implementing regulations, and Congress attached no consequence whatsoever to missing it. Deadlines of this kind slip often enough to be unremarkable; after Dodd-Frank, agencies missed roughly 60% of the deadlines Congress set for them.

Fallback written into Section 20 is what replaces the missed date, and it sets the Act live on the earlier of eighteen months after enactment or 120 days after final rules land. Eighteen months brings us to 2027년 1월 18일, so the backstop now governs, and an entire industry is building compliance programs around language that can still be rewritten.

수익 라인을 우회하기

Section 4(a)(11) forbids permitted payment stablecoin issuers from paying holders any interest or yield tied to holding, using, or keeping the token. It binds the issuer and stays silent on affiliates and distribution partners, which is how Coinbase can keep paying USDC holders a reward funded by a revenue share with Circle.

규제 당국은 이 틈을 충분히 일찍 포착해 조치를 취했으며, OCC는 2월에 수익을 제휴사나 제3자를 통해 우회하는 방식을 반박 가능한 추정으로 제안했습니다. 해당 제안에 대한 의견은 5월 1일에 마감되었으며, 최종 조정은 아직 작성되지 않았고 법적 제한의 적용 범위도 불확실하게 남아 있습니다.

법이 허용하는 범위와 관계없이 수익에 대한 수요는 계속 상승했으며, 수익을 제공하는 스테이블코인의 공급량은 2023년 약 10억 달러에서 2025년에는 190억 달러를 넘어섰습니다. 이러한 토큰은 올해 1분기 동안 순증 80억 달러 중 43억 달러를 제공했으며, 이는 시장 전체 성장의 절반 이상을 차지합니다.

수익 제한이 실제로 법이 명시한 목표를 달성하고 있는가, 아니면 의도치 않은 틈을 만들어 그에 반하고 있는가? 규제된 제품이 수익을 제공하지 못하도록 하면, 규제되지 않은 해외 발행자와 DeFi 프로토콜은 제한이 없으므로, 결과적으로 전 세계 스테이블코인 시스템이 계층화됩니다.

아이러니에 가까운 현상이 사람들의 이동 방향에서 나타납니다. 수익을 추구하는 사용자들은 GENIUS 법이 제공하려는 준비금, 상환 및 공시 보호 장치가 없는 장소로 떠돌아 다니며, 이는 미국 기반 발행자의 경쟁자에게 이점을 주고 미국 소비자들을 매력적이지 않은 옵션 중에서 선택하도록 만들게 됩니다.

Washington also wrote itself a three-year safe harbor before digital asset service providers are barred from offering non-permitted stablecoins to US persons. Once that runs out, the natural home for yield-hungry balances is somewhere no American supervisor can reach.

무언가를 바꾸기에 충분한 시간

Rules finalized after September 20 lose the ability to pull the effective date forward, since the 120-day clock would then run past 2027년 1월 18일, meaning whatever regulators settle on this fall is what the market lives with.

Comment windows across several agencies are still sitting open. The FDIC’s Bank Secrecy Act and sanctions proposal for supervised issuers takes submissions through August 4, which puts the practical window for changing anything at a matter of weeks.

Submissions move final text. BlackRock filed a 17-page letter on the last day of the OCC’s window, pushing the agency to drop a possible 20% cap on tokenized reserve assets and widen the list of eligible instruments. Whether that lands will be visible in the final rule.

Every one of these proposals sits in public dockets that anybody in the industry can read and answer before the windows shut. Which firms will actually put something on the record?

Europe Reopened Its Own File

Europe offers a useful data point for anyone convinced a framework is finished the moment it gets signed. MiCA’s licensing regime only took full effect on July 1, and Brussels is already consulting stakeholders until September 30 on whether to reopen the legislation, with a revision penciled in for 2027.

Among the gaps under review are the treatment of issuers headquartered outside the bloc and the multi-issuance model, where one token is issued by several entities across jurisdictions and stays interchangeable for whoever holds it. Europe wrote the first comprehensive crypto framework and has accepted that a fast market exposed things its drafters could not have seen coming.

Treating any single provision as permanent is a choice somebody made, and choices of that kind can be unmade. Washington has the identical option sitting in front of it, and the argument for using it strengthens every month the yield gap stays open.

예금을 잃음으로써 보호하기

Banks arguing for the restriction are not being unreasonable about the underlying risk – $6.6 trillion of US transactional deposits is flagged as exposed to stablecoin substitution.

A prohibition binding only compliant issuers does very little to protect those deposits from Tether or Ethena. It constrains Circle and Paxos, the issuers American supervisors can walk into and examine, and pushes the balance-sheet risk somewhere much harder to watch. So whose savings does a rule built that way genuinely protect?

Letting compliant stablecoins compete on equal terms would keep yield-seeking demand inside the regulated perimeter. There, reserve composition, monthly disclosure, redemption rights and holder priority in insolvency all apply. Supervisors would get to oversee that demand instead of watching it emigrate.

수정 가능성

My own expectation is that the yield question gets reopened inside eighteen months, through market structure legislation instead of agency interpretation, and that whatever emerges leans toward disclosure and a narrow activity-based safe harbor over a flat ban. Banks win the first round at the OCC and lose the second one in Congress.

By 2027년 1월, when the Act finally switches on, the biggest yield-paying dollar tokens will almost certainly still be sitting outside its perimeter, pulling American money toward supervisors who answer to nobody in Washington. The result will be the most persuasive case for amendment anyone could assemble, and the drafters will have built it themselves.