Digital Securities
Do Tokenized Treasuries Really Broaden Investor Access?

Putting an investment on a blockchain can make it easier to transfer. Making it easier to buy is a separate challenge. A digital token may be divisible into tiny units, yet the investment behind it can still require a large minimum subscription, restrict eligible buyers, or charge fees that reduce its appeal.
A new study, “Tokenized Treasuries as Real-World Assets: Market Structure, Product Design, and On-Chain Distribution,” examines that distinction.1 Accepted by Borsa Istanbul Review, Guizhou Wang’s research analyzes 65 active products representing approximately $12.8 billion in reported assets on March 30, 2026.
Its findings suggest that evaluating tokenization requires looking beyond how much money moves on-chain. Product terms, distribution channels, and the meaning of participation matter just as much. That creates a useful question for investors: does blockchain change who can participate, what participants can do, or both?
What Investors Own When They Buy Tokenized Treasuries
The products studied are not Treasury securities issued directly on a blockchain by the U.S. government. They are privately issued investment products backed primarily by Treasuries, government repurchase agreements, Treasury-focused money-market instruments, or related short-duration exposures.
The token might represent a fund share, note, or certificate. Its legal structure determines the investor’s rights, while blockchain provides infrastructure for recording ownership and transferring the claim.
This distinction, explored in Securities.io’s explanation of tokenized Treasury yield, liquidity, and wrapper risk, matters because a familiar underlying asset does not make every product equivalent. Two tokens can ultimately depend on similar government securities while offering different fees, eligibility requirements, custody arrangements, and redemption processes.
What the Tokenized Treasury Study Found
Wang examined a single market snapshot drawn from RWA.xyz and supplemented with issuer disclosures and official regulatory sources. The sample covered 31 platforms and 16 issuer domiciles. Eight additional listed products lacked reported assets under management and were excluded.
The resulting picture combines substantial assets with uneven distribution. The largest products account for much of the money, while many products have small observable blockchain footprints.
| Study Measure | Finding |
|---|---|
| Observation Date | March 30, 2026 |
| Active Products Analyzed | 65 |
| Total Reported Assets | $12.778 billion |
| Asset Share of Four Largest Products | 59.2% |
| Median Holding Addresses per Product | 19 |
| Products Disclosing Minimum Investments | 46 |
Higher management fees were associated with fewer holding addresses after accounting for product scale. Within the 46-product subsample disclosing minimum investments, higher entry thresholds were also associated with narrower address distribution.
These are correlations, not proof that changing a fee or minimum would produce a particular result. An issuer targeting institutions might simultaneously choose larger minimums, specialized custody, and a distribution model involving relatively few wallets.
Why Wallet Counts Cannot Measure Investor Inclusion
The median of 19 holding addresses is striking, but calling that “19 investors” would misrepresent the research.
A single custodial address can hold assets for many customers. Conversely, one investor may use several addresses. Operational wallets and smart contracts can further complicate the relationship between blockchain records and beneficial owners.
Consider a hypothetical platform serving thousands of customers through one pooled wallet. Moving those customers into individual wallets would greatly increase its visible address count without adding a single investor. Consolidating individual wallets into pooled custody could produce the opposite impression.
This exposes a measurement problem for the wider tokenization industry. Assets under management measure scale. Wallet counts describe an observable distribution footprint. Neither independently establishes that previously excluded people gained access.
Stronger evidence would track unique beneficial investors, account sizes, eligibility, and participation over time. Until those measures improve, claims about democratization should distinguish technical accessibility from demonstrated investor inclusion.
Lower Minimums Are Only One Part of Access
Tokenization makes fractional representation possible, but commercial rules determine whether that capability reaches customers. A product divided into small units can still impose a large initial purchase requirement.
Access also involves more than the subscription threshold. An affordable product may require unavailable identification documents, exclude an investor’s jurisdiction, or depend on unfamiliar wallet software. An easy purchase process may still lead to a complicated exit.
A practical assessment therefore asks:
- Who is eligible to buy and hold the product?
- What minimum investment and total costs apply?
- How can holders redeem or transfer their investment?
- What useful capability does blockchain add?
Recent coverage of WisdomTree’s Onchain platform illustrates why distribution deserves attention alongside issuance. Its institutional portal and application programming interface connect products with clients and distributors. Creating the token is one step; building convenient pathways to use it is another.
Investment Access and Investment Utility Are Different
A narrowly distributed product is not necessarily unsuccessful. An institutional fund may deliberately serve a small number of large customers while improving how those customers move collateral or manage cash.
This suggests two separate tests. The access test asks whether more eligible investors can participate on reasonable terms. The utility test asks whether existing participants can accomplish something more efficiently.
For example, a business might value moving between a tokenized fund and digital settlement money within an integrated workflow. That capability could matter even if its investment minimum remains unchanged.
Franklin Templeton’s June 2026 announcement of its MoonPay institutional distribution partnership illustrates this approach. The integration is designed to help eligible institutions move between supported stablecoins and tokenized money-market fund exposure.
Such developments can represent useful progress without establishing universal access. Evaluating the intended customer and actual workflow produces a clearer assessment than judging every tokenized product against the same retail participation goal.
Why Yield Comparisons Need Context
The study also examines returns. Among 29 products reporting seven-day yields, the average annual percentage yield was approximately 2.93%, compared with the study’s 3.64% effective federal funds rate benchmark. The asset-weighted average was approximately 3.25%.
Those figures describe the observation-date sample, not today’s available returns. They also do not establish that every difference represents avoidable costs. The federal funds rate is a benchmark rather than an identically structured investment available through the same channels.
Portfolio composition, expenses, cash balances, and reporting conventions can affect comparisons. Nevertheless, the gap raises a useful commercial question: what does the customer receive in exchange for any yield sacrificed?
If a product provides valuable transfer or collateral functionality, a customer might accept additional costs. If it simply duplicates an existing investment experience, its fees become harder to justify. The relevant comparison is the complete service delivered for the complete price paid.
Franklin Templeton Offers Exposure to Tokenized Fund Development
That focus on product design and distribution makes Franklin Templeton a relevant publicly traded company for investors following the sector. Its Benji Technology Platform supports blockchain-based recordkeeping and transfer-agency functions for investment products.
BEN Price Chart
The Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund launched in 2021. In its April 2026 BENJI five-year update, the company reported investor growth exceeding 140% between April 2024 and March 2026. That company-reported measure complements, rather than substitutes for, the study’s market-wide address analysis.
The investment question extends beyond tokenized assets accumulated. Investors should consider whether these products attract durable customer relationships, generate sustainable revenue, and reduce operating friction. Lower fees may support adoption while also limiting revenue earned per dollar managed.
Owning Franklin Templeton shares provides exposure to its broader asset-management business. It does not replicate ownership of its tokenized fund or provide a pure investment in blockchain adoption.
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What Would Demonstrate Broader Tokenized Treasury Access?
The study’s central contribution is a better standard for evaluating progress. Blockchain can improve financial infrastructure while familiar commercial barriers remain. Dedicated legal infrastructure, meanwhile, was not significantly associated with broader holding-address distribution in this sample, which does not establish that regulation is unimportant.
Future evidence should connect product changes with actual investor outcomes: who joined, what they paid, and whether transferring or redeeming became easier. Because the research covers active products on one date, it cannot show how participation evolved or account fully for products that previously disappeared.
The opportunity remains substantial. Tokenization becomes more compelling when its technical capabilities support useful, competitively priced products. Demonstrating that outcome will require measuring both the people reached and the practical value delivered.
References:
1 Wang, G. (2026). Tokenized treasuries as real-world assets: Market structure, product design, and on-chain distribution. Borsa Istanbul Review. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2026.100921












